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ABSTRACT 
 
Western countries have disapproved of emigration restrictions more than of 
immigration restrictions. The paper uses a variant of the model of optimal income 
taxation under migration to seek a rationale for the prevalent asymmetric attitude. 
Optimal policies are derived through maximization of the welfare of the initially 
existing population. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by their 
types of labour. These individuals may migrate between two countries, “home” 
and “foreign”. The results show that under emigration income redistribution will 
according to tradition be incomplete: transfer recipients will always have lower 
disposable incomes. Moreover, an emigrant, skilled or less skilled, will gain, 
otherwise he would not move. On the other hand, under immigration of taxpayers 
there are situations where taxpayers will have lower after-tax incomes than 
transfer recipients. If instead, transfer recipients are those who immigrate, 
optimal redistribution is conventional. Consequently, an approving attitude 
towards emigration is easy to understand as well as the opposite attitude towards 
free immigration. However, the explanation is not complete. More conclusive 
analytical results should be obtained. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The basic fact of migration is that an individual changes his residence and 
employment from one country to another. The phenomenon of migration implies 
not only that an individual has decided to leave the country in which he is living 
but also that the potential host countries have decided whether to accept the 
immigrant or not (except in the case of movements back to the country of origin, 
where this problem does not usually arise). During the past few decades, the 
world has witnessed a very significant easing of restrictions in the exchange of 
both goods and services. This has also been evidenced in the flow of capital. 
Nevertheless, the movement of people is still subject to quite significant 
restrictions.  
 
Western countries have disapproved of emigration restrictions more than of 
immigration restrictions. The immigration of individuals has been subject to strict 
control everywhere. However, this is not true of emigration. Any restriction of the 
freedom to emigrate is often considered to be an infringement of human rights.1 
Italy, for instance, has undergone a migration transition from an emigration to an 
immigration country. At the same time it has become a reluctant land for 
immigration. During the period of emigration, Italy enacted no immigration 
policies, but at present there are stricter rules for becoming a legal resident.2 Also, 
even though the existing association agreements within the EU as well as within 
the Nordic Countries proscribe any interference with the flow of people across 
state boundaries, immigration from outside the area, i.e. from third countries, is 
controlled.3 In Switzerland, decisions have been adopted to stabilize the stock of 
foreign workers in response to public opinion hostile to “over-foreignisation” of 
the country. 
 
Recently, western European countries have experienced increased migration 
pressures from the East and South. Still, the capacity of the countries to absorb 
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migrants is fairly limited. Moreover, public opinion would have great difficulty in 
accepting a massive influx of migrants. Immigration flows have been regulated to 
minimize social, ethnic and economic side effects of uncontrolled migration. This 
regulation has caused asylum seeking to become one of the principal means of 
immigration into the EU, and illegal immigration has become a topic of common 
public concern.4 The Single European Market makes it easy for foreign workers 
living in one country to move to others within the same free-trade area. This 
enables illegal immigrants to use one EU country as a port of entry then to move 
on to another. Consequently, the UK government (as well as Ireland and 
Denmark) remains firmly committed to maintaining its own entry controls.  
 
If migration were determined by free market conditions, we could expect to find a 
massive flow of people from the less developed to the more developed countries. 
Therefore the immigration policies of permanent labour-importing countries have 
become more selective. Quality as well as quantity restrictions have been set. 
The volume of immigration is often determined purely by the national interest: 
employing migrant workers should make a positive contribution to the well-being 
of the industrial countries admitting immigrants.5 Countries aim to protect their 
own nationals’ jobs by ensuring that foreigners are not employed at the expense 
of their own citizens. Immigration has been controlled, for instance, with the so 
called Gastarbeiter system6, where the level and the composition of immigrant 
labour is determined by demand considerations. Canada and Australia pursue a 
selective immigration policy. A large number of immigrants are recruited to satisfy 
specific labour market requirements.7 Some immigration systems are ostensibly 
run on non-economic principles as the present control system8 in the United 
States.  
 
The decision to admit immigrants lies with the government of the country 
concerned. Control of migration may be direct, such as by imposing quotas, or 
indirect in that the government influences the parameters determining movement. 
Work permit regulations as well as “tax/transfer” options have been used.9 
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Migration can be encouraged or discouraged by increasing or diminishing the 
advantages it offers. However, an observable fact is that despite the identical 
material advantages that emigration offers to some group of people, not all of 
them will decide to leave their home country. People visualize the advantages in 
quite different ways and their reactions to the same material incentives may also 
differ. To be successful the objectives of migration policy have to meet the needs 
and aspirations of a large part of the migrant workers.  
 
But why is immigration more likely to be restricted than emigration? This 
important policy issue has been neglected in the literature. Nevertheless, 
explanations have been given for the resistance to low-skill immigration.10 Labour 
market concerns, welfare concerns and racial attitudes are suggested to be the 
three main factors which shape individual preferences for further immigration. 
The findings of Dustman and Peston (2001 and 2003) establish that both 
economic and racial factors appear to matter, but suggest that race is the 
dominant underlying issue. Mayda (2004) identifies a strong empirical regularity 
concerning the relationship between individual skill and attitudes toward 
immigrants. Non-economic variables also appear to be correlated with 
immigration attitudes but they do not seem to significantly alter the results in the 
economic explanations. This paper considers the problem from the perspective 
of national interest. We use a variant of the Mirrlees (1982) model. The plan of 
the paper is as follows. Sections 2-3 briefly review the conceptual issues of the 
model and introduce the welfare criterion. In section 4 we characterize the 
optimal income tax (redistribution) policy of the country and evaluate the 
desirability of migration. Section 5 is devoted to numerical calculations. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
Following the model of optimal income taxation under migration in a simple two-
country case 11  we assume a world with two types of people classed by 
productivity. Let there be ( )2,1=iiN  people in each category in the world which 
is composed of a home country (country d ) and a foreign country (country ). 
Denote by m  the equilibrium number of i -individuals at home. Thus, the 
domestic production function can be written as 
f
( 2,1=ii )
( )21 ,mmFY =  which, for simplicity, 
is assumed to have constant returns to scale. Denote marginal products by F  
and consumption levels for the two classes by x  (  for consumer type, 
i
ij i j  for 
country; i ). Everyone is assumed to have the same utility function: fdj ,;2,1 ==
( )ijxuu = . 
 
We assume that g  people of type i  regard living in country d  as worth 
utility  more than living in country  at the same consumption level. Naturally, 
 may be positive or negative. Let G  be the distribution function. Consequently, 
( )dvvi
v f
iv
(vi )G  people of type i  think country  worth at least d v  more than country : f
 
( ) ( )∫
∞
=
v
ii dvvgvG . 
 
Then, in equilibrium under free migration the number of people of type i  in 
country  is  d
 
(1) . ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
=−=
idif xuxu
iidifii dvvgxuxuGm
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3. THE WELFARE OF NATIONALS 
 
According to Mirrlees (1982, 320) three different welfare criteria occur to people 
thinking about migration, depending on the group whose welfare is to count. One 
could restrict the group to those who do not migrate, to nationals or to all humans 
in the world. Depending on the migration question under consideration one might 
wish to define the population concerned in different ways.   
 
In this paper we will take the national welfare point of view. We try to formulate a 
welfare function with which it is possible to explain why countries disapprove of 
emigration restrictions more than of immigration restrictions. One way of dealing 
with this is to assume that an initially existing national population within a country 
will approve of increased or reduced migration if that increases the total utility of 
the initial population. Then there is an equilibrium – a kind of optimum – when the 
existing population desires no changes in consumption levels. 
 
Denote by  the number of initial population in country d . Suppose that 
initially consumption levels are . Consider, for the welfare above, the utility of 
the m  existing class one consumers. If there were an increase in m , its total 
utility denoted by W  would be 
( 2,1* =imi
1
)
*
idx
*
i 1
 
(2) . ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
+=
*
11
11
*
11
df xuxu
d dvvvgxumW
 
If there were a reduction in , total utility would be 1m
 
(3) . ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
+−−+−=
df xuxu
fdfddf dvvvgxuxuxuGmxuxuxuGW
11
11111
*
111111
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For (2) we have 
 
( )d
d
xum
x
W
1
*
1
1
1 '=∂
∂  
 
and for (3) we have 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( dddf
d
xumxuxuxuG
x
W
1
*
11111
1
1 '' =−=∂
∂ )  
 
in the initial position. Similarly, we could consider total utility of existing 
consumers of class 2. Thus, the impact on total utility owing to a small change in 
 is , i . idx ( ) ididi dxxum '* 2,1=
 
4. LABOUR MOBILITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 
 
4.1. Tax Rules 
 
There are no explicit restrictions on immigration or emigration. Migration is 
regulated by means of tax policy, not by explicit migration regulations. The home 
government imposes taxes on the incomes of all residents in the country but is 
unable to tax emigrants. In this case there is only one resource constraint: 
 
(4) . ∑
=
=
2
1
21 ),(
i
idi mmFxm
 
Thus, country d , in choosing x  and , does not worry about the resource 
constraint of country . There will, of course, be changes in x  as a result of 
changes in migration, but at the margin these can be ignored by the home 
country. 
d1 dx2
f if
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The government is assumed to have perfect information regarding the 
characteristics of the individuals and its objective is to maximize the total utility of 
the initially existing domestic population subject to its own budget constraint. The 
final number of people in the economy may be higher or lower than the initial 
number. No tax discrimination is allowed between people of type i ; i.e. every 
individual of type i  in the country will receive the same after-tax income.12 Thus, 
immigrants are given zero welfare weight in the measurement of social welfare13 
but they will be paid and taxed as original nationals. 
 
The optimization problem can now be set as maximizing the Lagrange function 
 
(5) , ( ) 

 −−+= ∑∑
==
TxmmmFWL
i
idi
i
i
2
1
21
2
1
,λ
 
where T  is the predetermined level of taxes to be collected by the government 
and λ  is the Lagrange multiplier of the tax revenue constraint. 
 
From (5) we can calculate the FOCs for 2,1; =ixid : 
 
(6) ( ) 0'* =

 −∂
∂−∂
∂⋅+=∂
∂
iid
id
i
id
i
iidi
id
mx
x
m
x
m
Fxum
x
L λ , 
 
where 
i
i m
FF ∂
∂= . 
 
Here, the first term can be interpreted as the utility gain and the second as the 
value of the tax revenue change. The impact of a small change in x  on tax id
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revenue in the domestic economy, assuming that marginal productivities do not 
change, is to reduce it by  ( ) idiididi
id
i dxmdxxF
x
m −−∂
∂ . 
 
Information about propensities to migrate can be expressed by the elasticity 
*
*
i
id
id
i
i m
x
x
m
z ∂
∂= . With this notation, (6) can be rewritten as the modified Ramsey rule 
for every i : 
 
(7) ( )

 −=− id
i
i
iid
idi xu
m
m
zx
xF
'11 ** λ . 
 
The left hand side of (7) is the tax as a proportion of after-tax income. This is not 
an explicit formula for the optimal tax, since z  as well as m  is a function of 
.
*
i i
idx
14 
 
At the optimum 
(8) 
( )
( )
2
2
2
*
2
1
1
1
*
1
2
22
1
11
'11
'11
z
xu
m
m
z
xu
m
m
x
xF
x
xF
d
d
d
d
d
d
λ
λ
−
−
=−
−
 , 
 
where instead of  elasticity *iz
i
id
id
i
i m
x
x
m
z ∂
∂=  has been used. 
 
Suppose that  is constant (does not depend on i  noriz x ) and all individuals are 
taxpayers. Then,  
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,1
2
22
1
11
>
<=−
−
d
d
d
d
x
xF
x
xF
  if  ( ) ( )dd xum
mxu
m
m
2
2
*
2
1
1
*
1 ''
<
>= . 
 
Consequently, an individual of type 1 pays higher tax (as a proportion of after-tax 
income) than an individual of type 2 if his marginal utility weighted by the 
proportion of the initially existing number to the after-migration number of people 
in his category is lower than that in category 2. Further, if the proportions are 
identical in each category, i.e. *
2
2
*
1
1
m
m
m
m = , a person with higher x  will pay higher 
taxes.15 All in all, denoting the resources of the economy by Π ,  the optimal 
choice  must satisfy the condition ),( 21 dd xx
 
( )
( )
d
d
d
d
x
x
xum
xum
2
1
2
*
2
1
*
1
'
'
∂
Π∂
∂
Π∂
= . 
 
Hence  *2
2
*
1
1
// m
x
m
x dd ∂
Π∂=∂
Π∂ >
<
 leads to . dd xx 21
<
>=
 
4.2. Emigration versus Immigration 
 
Turning now to further details of the tax structure the analysis is simplified to 
better understand the results and the nature of the problem. We focus on the 
case with just one group mobile at a time, either skilled or less-skilled workers 
but not both at the same time. Furthermore, since the specification of the welfare 
function depends on the direction of migration, the cases will be analysed 
separately. Taxation is assumed to be purely redistributive; the tax revenue 
requirement T .   0=
 10
 
Consider first the case of emigration, and let m . The number of type 1 
people who remain in the economy is 
*
22 m=
=1m [1G )( 1 fxu )( 1dxu− ], a decreasing 
function of [u ]. A small change in , )()( 11 df xux − d1 1x 0<ddx , induces a few people 
of type 1 to emigrate, and the impact on welfare  
 
=W ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
+−−+−
df xuxu
fdfddf dvvvgxuxuxuGmxuxuxuG
11
11111
*
11111  
 
  +    ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
+
*
22
22
*
2
df xuxu
d dvvvgxum
is 
 
(9)  =
ddx
dW
1
)())(('))((')()( 11111111 fdddd xuxuGxuGxuxuG ′−−′−+′  
 
  [ ]
d
d
dddfdf dx
dx
xumxuxuxugxuxu
1
2
2
*
2111111 )())(())()(()()( ′+′−−−− .  
 
Now, totally differentiating the resource constraint (4) keeping m  constant yields 
a change in  that would arise in response to a small change in : 
2
dx2 dx1
 
(10) ( )[ ])(1 11111*
21
2
dd
d
d xugFxm
mdx
dx ′−−−= . 
 
For optimality  
 
(11) 0
1
=
ddx
dW . 
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Hence, using (9), (10), (11) and the fact that 11 ' gG −=  we obtain the solution: 
 
(12) [ ] )()()()()( 21111211 ddddd xuxugFxxuxum ′⋅′⋅⋅−=′−′⋅ . 
 
From this it is easily seen that under emigration transfer recipients, whether they 
are type 1 people (potential emigrants) or not, will always have lower disposable 
incomes.16 
 
To examine the case of immigration we have to study the effects using the 
objective function 
 
=W ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∫
∞
−
+
*
11
11
*
1
df xuxu
d dvvvgxum ( ) ( )( ) ( )∫
∞
−
++
*
22
22
*
2
df xuxu
d dvvvgxum  
 
which implies the result 
 
(13) 0)()(
1
2
2
*
21
*
1
1
=⋅′⋅+′⋅=
d
d
dd
d dx
dx
xumxum
dx
dW . 
 
Substituting (10) into (13) we find that 
 
(14) )()(
)(
)(
11111
2
1*
1 dd
d
d xugFxm
xu
xu
m ′⋅⋅−=−′
′⋅ . 
 
Consequently, when there is immigration of taxpayers, we have 
 
*
1
1
2
1
)(
)(
m
m
xu
xu
d
d <′
′
.  
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Now, since 0
)(
)(
2
1 >′
′
d
d
xu
xu  and , we can deduce that x . This means 
that under immigration of taxpayers there are situations where taxpayers will 
have lower after-tax incomes than transfer recipients. If, instead, transfer 
recipients are those who immigrate, optimal redistribution is conventional and 
transfer recipients will have lower disposable incomes. 
*
11 mm > dd x21
<
>=
 
An approving attitude towards emigration is easy to understand from the 
migrant’s point of view. Migration is assumed to be an increasing function of 
[ ], the difference between the utilities abroad and at home.  A 
migrant, skilled or less skilled, who decides to move, gains, otherwise he would 
not move. If we evaluate emigration from the perspective of national interest, the 
reasoning is no longer so straightforward. We cannot restrict the group whose 
welfare demands consideration to those who migrate; the welfare of those left 
behind also matters. However, it is self-evident here that under low-skill 
emigration those who do not migrate also gain, since economic resources 
(income) per individual will rise. If the emigrants are skilled, resources per person 
at home tend to decline. Nevertheless, emigrants themselves gain and welfare in 
total (assumed to depend on the utility of all natives, whether working in the 
country or not) is maximised. Individuals decide their residence according to the 
place where utility is highest. 
)()( 11 df xuxu −
 
Although attitudes are generally favourable towards emigration, free immigration 
is opposed. Immigrants do not become full members of the country. They are 
paid and taxed as original nationals, but their well-being is not taken into account; 
they are excluded from the welfare criterion. Desirability of immigration is 
evaluated from the viewpoint of total utility of the initial population.  Low-skill 
immigration makes redistribution more costly, explaining the negative attitudes 
towards it. Immigration of high-skill individuals makes the country richer in the 
sense that the proportion of high income individuals increases. This increases 
the possibilities for redistribution, which is hardly opposed by any national 
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transfer recipient. However, as shown above, a high proportion of skilled 
individuals may imply excessive redistribution with lower after-tax incomes for 
taxpayers than for transfer recipients. Among high-skill nationals this can be 
considered as if not a loss, at least a kind of unfairness. 
 
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
To gain a deeper understanding of the optimal solution discussed above, we 
have adopted a numerical version of the model. Supplementing the theoretical 
construct with some hard numbers and figures will hopefully illustrate and 
contribute to the interpretation of the results derived. Numerical analysis can be 
seen as providing a check on the interpretations and a means of investigating 
them further. The calculations were carried out with utility function u . For 
 we used a logistic distribution: 
( )xlog=
iG ( ) ( )bvii eNv += 1/G , where v  is the utility 
difference ( ) ( )idif xuxu − . Parameter b  was chosen to be 5, and the number of 
people in the two categories in the world was set: 10001 =N  and .20002 =N 17 
The total number of initial people in the home country, the native population, was 
assumed to be 1500 and three different ability structures of the premigration 
population were chosen to be explored: 
 
(A)  and  250*1 =m 1250*2 =m
(B)  and  500*1 =m 1000*2 =m
(C)  and . 750*1 =m 750*2 =m
 
For simplicity, optimal policies were calculated for an economy where ’s are 
given (  and ) and taxation is purely redistributive. 
iF
161 =F 102 =F
 
Now, it is the change in the utility difference u idif u−  that generates population 
movements in this economy, provided that the ( )vgi  function remains unchanged; 
 14
2,1=i . For instance, a small change in x , d1 01 <d
f2
dx , induces a few people of 
type 1 to emigrate, ceteris paribus. In the following, we focus our attention on the 
effects of changes in foreign after-tax incomes, and, contrary to the analysis in 
the preceding section, both types of individuals are assumed to be mobile. Under 
each case from A to C we have calculated: (1) the effect of x  on , , 
and , with x , (2) the effect of x  on , , and , with 
 and (3) the effect of 
f1
1m
dx1
2m
dx2
1m
121 =fx
2m 122 =f dx1 dx2
=f1x   on  , , and . The findings are 
shown in Figures 2.1 -4.3. 
fx2 d dx2 m
fx2
1
x1 1 2m
13
12=fx
=fx
7
151 =fx d1
1
d1
=f
f1
x
12=
 
As expected, the results are sensitive to the initial (premigration) ability 
distribution of the population. The level of income redistribution as well as the 
number and distribution of the final population depend on the ability structure of 
the premigration population. Also, increasing disposable incomes abroad induces 
emigration, which, in turn, tends to raise after-tax incomes within that group at 
home. 
  
Now, let us consider more closely one of the cases, say case B, in which the 
original population of country d  (home country) consists of 500 skilled (type 1) 
and 1000 less-skilled (type 2) individuals. (Figures 3.1-3.3) Consider first the 
migration of people of type 1 (Figure 3.1). When  is fixed ( ), there will 
be immigration of people of type 1, for instance with 
2
, and emigration with 
. Under the immigration optimal x  will be about 14.3 and under the 
emigration optimal x  will be 14.9. A situation where individuals of type 1 
(taxpayers) will have lower after-tax income than individuals of type 2 (transfer 
recipients) is induced, for instance, by x . Similarly, we can consider 
migration of individuals of type 2 (Figure 3.2). When x  is fixed, then for 
example  will induce some people of type 2 to immigrate to country d , 
whereas with x  some of them will move out. Here, under the emigration 
102 =f
2 f
 15
optimal  will be about 11.5 and under the immigration optimal  will be 11.0. 
Excessive income redistribution occurs for example with 
dx2 dx2
192 =fx . In the special 
case (Figure 3.3) when the tax policy abroad is fully redistributive so that after-tax 
incomes are equalized, 1121 == ff x
1
x  would mean immigration of both types of 
individuals to country d , whereas 152 == ff x
dx2
d1
dx1
x  would make country  more 
attractive to many unskilled but also to some skilled people. Under the 
immigration optimal x  and optimal  would be about 13.8 and 11.6, 
respectively, whereas under the emigration x  = 14.2 and  = 11.8. With 
 there are individuals of type 1 who will immigrate to country  and 
individuals of type 2 who emigrate implying  = 13.9 and  = 11.7.  
f
d
d1
d2x
dx2
1221 =f xx =f
 
The results show that disposable incomes for skilled individuals will be higher 
under emigration than under immigration, when the utility level abroad of less 
skilled ones is given. The same result holds true for less skilled people, when the 
utility level abroad of skilled people is fixed. However, in both cases the outcome 
has been obtained to some extent at the expense of the other group, whose 
domestic disposable income varies reversely. Moreover, the finding that there 
seem to be limit values for domestic optimal after tax incomes when the tax 
policy abroad is fully redistributive is interesting. Equalized after-tax incomes 
abroad, however, do not imply equalized after-tax incomes at home. The figures 
also demonstrate that there are indeed situations where excessive income 
redistribution occurs, as shown in section 4.18 
 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
It seems to be a difficult task to apply economic modelling to justify the reasons 
why governments disapprove of emigration restrictions more than of immigration 
restrictions. This paper used a variant of the model of optimal income taxation 
under migration to seek a rationale for the prevalent asymmetric attitude. Optimal 
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policies are derived through maximization of the welfare of the original population. 
This is a target with which the country does not try to keep people merely 
because they are contented, and does not try to lose them because they are 
miserable. 
 
The analysis above shows that low-skill immigration leads to losses to the native-
born population, whereas under out-migration of low-skill natives the country 
stands to gain. The total effect of high-skill emigration on the welfare of the 
natives, however, is not so clear. There are two opposite effects: emigration of 
high-skill nationals entails losses to those left behind, but generates gains to the 
migrants. Immigration of high-skill individuals, instead, is beneficial in tending to 
increase the consumption of the native-born residents. On the other hand, the 
present redistribution policy may lead to excessive redistribution, indicating lower 
disposable incomes for taxpayers, which can be regarded as an unfair result 
from the perspective of skilled individuals.  
 
With a simple nationalistic model we have sought an economic explanation for 
the asymmetric attitude towards emigration and immigration. However, the 
explanation achieved is not complete. The issue needs to be more closely 
examined. Stronger analytical results are likely to be obtained by introducing 
some constraints into the original framework. 
 
Taxation and redistribution policy could be determined at political economy 
equilibrium by a balance between those who gain and those who lose. In practice, 
however, it is not the whole population but a minority who decides on immigration 
and emigration. The obvious political reason for asymmetry is that immigration 
involves giving a concession to outsiders, whereas restricting emigration would 
involve restricting insiders. To put it another way, people prefer to put restrictions 
on other people than on themselves. If people value national homogeneity, we 
have an immediate explanation of the asymmetric attitude to immigration and 
emigration: a country does not become less homogeneous if some people leave 
 17
the country but it does if a similar number of foreigners come in. This could, 
perhaps, be captured by introducing congested public goods and assuming that 
foreigners congest more than original population. Presumably then, if there are 
diseconomies of scale in providing public goods one can rationalize the opposite 
preference for emigration and immigration.  
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idx
NOTES 
1  Emigration is a basic human right established by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including its own, and to return to his country”. The 
right of immigration, however, is not recognized by international law.  
 
2  See Martin (1994, 165) and Hall (2000). 
 
3  In the Nordic Countries citizens have enjoyed complete freedom of movement since 1954. 
 
4  A big issue is how to distinguish genuine asylum-seekers from purely “economic” migrants. 
 
5  Lately, in many European countries special programmes have been implemented to attract immigrants 
with specific skills. 
 
6  See Bhagwati  - Schatz – Wong  (1984). 
 
7  Trends in International Migration (1992), Martin – Widgren (2002, 10, 32). 
 
8  There are four major categories of immigrant: relatives of U.S. residents, employment-based immigrants, 
refugees (and asylees) and diversity immigrants (selected from a lottery). 
 
9  Migration, Growth and Development (1978,20), Martin – Widgren (2002, 19). 
 
10  See, for instance, Razin – Sadka (1996), Müller (2000). 
 
11 Hämäläinen (1991).  
 
12  In OECD countries, by law, migrants must be paid the same wages as others for the same hours worked. 
 
13  The assumption that immigrants are not integrated into the welfare criteria of the country is justified by 
the fact that only full-fledged citizens can participate in the political process and, in general, a migrant does 
not become a citizen right away. Thus, the maximization of the welfare of the original nationals seems to 
me a reasonable one to address. 
 
14  Compare the rule to the Mirrlees (1982, 322) tax formula. 
 
15  Disposable incomes ’s will be equalised when workers are immobile ( ’s  are equal to zero). Note 
that also under migration it is possible to have after-tax incomes ’s equalized, provided  *
2
2
*
1
1
m
m
m
m ≠
[ ] 0)()( 21
. 
16  For transfer receiving emigrants (individuals of type 1) the right hand side of the optimality condition 
(12) is negative, implying that <′−′ dd xuxu dd xx 21. Consequently, < . If emigrants are 
taxpayers, the right hand side of (12) turns out to be positive which gives . Accordingly, transfer 
recipients, whether potential emigrants or not, will have lower disposable incomes. 
dd xx 21 >
 
17  Note that in this case we have: ( ) ( )[ ] ibifbidbidiidif Nxxxmxx +== /,/logv  and ( )[ ] ( )2,1/ =+=− iNxxxmN ibifbidbifii . – See Figure 1.  
 
18  See Leite-Monteiro (1997). 
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